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About the Author... |
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Matthew Hensley is the
President and co-Founder of the Institute for Public-Private Partnerships
(IP3), and an economist specializing in private sector participation in public
service provision. In addition to his PSP work, Mr. Hensley is the architect of
several landmark environmental infrastructure financial innovations, designed
to promote and guarantee investment in infrastructure. |
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Avoiding the Curse of Oil: Strategies to
Improve Governance and Finance Social Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa
Matthew Hensley
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Abstract |
Oil revenues do not necessarily equal
national wealth, as corruption and poor governance have caused many oil rich
countries (emerging market and developed countries alike), to squander their
economic potential. This article is drawn from an IP3 working paper slated for
publication in late 2006 that will propose innovative governance tools to
assist oil rich countries to leverage oil revenues more efficiently and
effectively. Author Matthew Hensley examines the root causes of the 'oil
curse' and highlights examples of African and European countries that have
taken steps to avoid it.
I. Introduction
Oil is currently $65 a barrel. Many
analysts, this author included, expect the spot and forward price of oil to
soar to as high as $150 or more in the not so distant future. While high and
higher oil prices have a significant impact on the global economy in general,
and high net importing countries and oil dependent users in particular, higher
prices should translate into a windfall for oil producing economies including
several in emerging markets including sub-Saharan Africa. However, the benefits
of oil revenues have not, and may not in the future, be captured and utilized
to the fullest potential for several of these countries. In emerging market
countries and developed countries alike, a common lack of capacity and
governance represents a tragic missed opportunity for equity and development
that has to be addressed. |
For many oil-producing countries in
emerging markets, petroleum revenues make up a significant percentage of
economic output, GDP, national and local budgets and foreign exchange earnings
and reserves. However, due to a number of "governance" issues, the management
and stewardship of petroleum revenues and wealth has been woefully inadequate.
In fact, some experts estimate than in certain countries, between 30-50% of oil
revenues have been diverted into other hands, "siphoned" off by corrupt
individuals, corporations or bureaucracies, or simply squandered on inefficient
and inappropriate spending or financing of projects. This situation is even
more egregious when one considers the recent windfalls of oil revenues based on
higher world prices and the urgent need for oil revenues to finance social and
economic development in once very poor countries.
As Table 1 indicates, the fact that per
capita income is barely increasing in most oil producing sub-Saharan countries
while oil revenues and earnings are soaring at a dramatic pace, tells us that
something is desperately wrong. However, many sub-Saharan African countries
have a chance, and some are beginning to examine strategies aimed at managing
petroleum revenues more transparently and effectively in order to capture the
benefits of petroleum wealth for current and future generations. Some such as
Sao Tome, Angola, Gabon, and Guinea are trying to establish mechanisms that not
only manage petroleum wealth as a means of economic governance and stewardship,
efforts that can not only lead to greater management and efficiency, but also
are looking at means to directly or indirectly finance essential social and
economic infrastructure.
|
Table 1 - African
Oil Reserves and Production |
| Country |
Proved Reserves End 2004 |
Production 2004 |
GNI Per Capita Income 2004 |
|
Thousand Million Barrels |
Thousand Barrels Daily |
US Dollars |
| Algeria |
9.2 |
1,563 |
$2,280 |
| Angola |
5.4 |
731 |
$1,030 |
| Cameroon |
0.4 |
80 |
$800 |
| Rep. of Congo (Brazzaville) |
1.5 |
271 |
$770 |
| Egypt |
2.9 |
758 |
$1,310 |
| Equatorial Guinea |
* |
181 |
$700 |
| Gabon |
2.5 |
301 |
$3,940 |
| Libya |
29.5 |
1,425 |
N/A |
| Nigeria |
24.0 |
2,184 |
$390 |
| Tunisa |
0.3 |
73 |
$2,630 |
| Other Africa |
0.9 |
284 |
|
| Total Africa |
76.7 |
7,814 |
|
| Percent of World Total |
7.3% |
10.3% |
|
* Included in "Other
Africa" Source: Statistical Review pf World Energy 2002 (BP
plc, 2002), World Bank Data & Statistics 2005 |
Some are initiating concepts that feature
public-private partnerships (PPP's); approaches whereby "Petroleum Revenue
Funds" are established to ring fence and professionally manage petroleum
revenues, professionally account for and invest funds in earmarked projects or
sectors of priority, and to reduce corruption and waste so that national
revenue from petroleum is contributing to national savings, income growth, and
overall economic development. These efforts should be accelerated throughout
Africa and donors, oil corporations, and civil society should all work together
to design and implement such arrangements for mutual beneficial reasons. Oil is
a finite resource. But the returns from prudent investment today can be long
lasting.
Can Sub-Saharan Africa
Avoid the Curse of Oil?
Over the last decade, offshore discoveries
of oil off the west and southern coast of Africa has yielded one of the most
promising oil finds in the world. 6-10 countries are by now established oil
producers and some are already producing at record levels. With output of more
than 4M barrels per day, Sub Saharan Africa already produces as much oil as
Iran, Venezuela, and Mexico combined. Output has increased by 40% in last the
last 8 years compared with 15% for the rest of the world. Africa is emerging as
a potential huge source of oil while the rest of the world's more mature fields
in the US, Mid-East, and Asia are in decline. Sudan, which only started
exporting five years ago now, produces more than some OPEC states. Nigeria is
producing over 3M barrels per day, and Angola may eclipse all producers in the
region and become one of the most prolific oil economies in the world. More
importantly, several small states in the Gulf of Guinea, sit on reserves
estimated at over 25 Billion Barrels. Equatorial Guinea, for example, is poised
to become Africa's third largest producer with close to 1Million barrels per
day. With a population of just over 500,000 citizens, it could be one of the
richest countries of the world, but without governance of petroleum revenue, it
will not.
The Oil Curse, just like the Dutch
Disease¹ , stems from the historic record of countries with prolific
extractive industries unable or willing to take advantage of those resources in
a sustainable manner. The experience of most countries that have received
large, unexpected income from natural resources is not positive. As Sachs and
Warren state in "The Curse of Natural Resources", "countries with large income
from natural resources have generally recorded weaker economic growth from
comparable countries due to mismanagement, corruption, capacity, and a lack of
vision for governing sustain ably. Table 1 above already indicates there is a
mismatch between barrels produced and exported, and reflows into the economy as
illustrated by low GDP and per capital income. Even with a preliminary
assessment, one can see that windfall gains in oil revenue are not translating
into neither per capital income or in social investment.
However, there are models to change that.
There can be a way to manage petroleum revenue, re-invest in the sector,
finance social investment, manage the sector sustainably and maintain
sovereignty. The experience of Norway provides a useful lesson.
Petroleum Revenue Funds:
From Norway to Sub-Saharan Africa
Social Needs or Investment Funds have been
in operation in many countries since the early 1980's. Initially conceived by
Norway, Mexico, and other petroleum exporting countries, the concept of
"ring-fencing" revenues and setting up a dedicated fund to nurture investments
and technical assistance in high priority sectors is still being fine tuned.
There are various models of Social Needs Funds ranging from the "Petroleum
Revenue Management Fund" where revenues are professionally managed for capital
appreciation and a percentage is dedicated to social investments (such as in
Azerbaijan, Mexico, and Kazakhstan, to "Social Funds" where revenues are ring
fenced and channeled directly to social needs projects in the form of grants
and technical assistance (as in Egypt, Bolivia, etc.) In all cases, the
benefits of such funds can only be realized if at the design stage; some
critical approaches are followed including:
- Governance systems need to be in place that separate
conflicts of interest between fund management and beneficiaries
- Fund Management should be representative and include
private sector and stakeholder participation if possible
- Clear rules and regulations on fund operations should be
in place prior to disbursements
- Independent auditing of activities should be required
and procurement practices should reflect international standards
- Guidelines on eligibility of project should be
established to ensure funds are allocated to priority projects and pass a
certain screening criteria
- Conditions should be built into the design to achieve
certain social objectives such as capacity building programs, development of
local consultants, diversification of resource allocations, and financial
sustainability
- Lastly, "sunset provisions" should be in place but
options for a transition strategy should be in place early.
The Lessons of Norway:
Governance and Petroleum
The oil age in Norway began in the 1970's
and will likely last many years in the future. A key part of its success was in
establishing the Petroleum Fund once it was recognized that oil was part of
national wealth and could not afford to be squandered by the state or by
individuals. In 1990, Norway established a transparent system for managing
petroleum revenues. All the revenues are transferred directly into a foreign
currency fund that is professionally managed. The Norwegian parliament must
adopt a resolution on any use of the fund beyond asset management. The Fund is
strictly off limits to special interests or spending. After years of
accumulating surpluses through prudent management and investment, the Petroleum
Fund is now one of the world's largest institutional investors. Norges Bank has
managed the fund on behalf of the Ministry of Finance and results are published
openly. The Fund invests not only in Norway, but internationally as well. This
allows for diversity and greater risk management.
Now that the Fund has accumulated
surpluses, and can be used as a hedge for fiscal management in the event of
downward oil prices, it is essentially a long-term savings tool for all
Norwegian citizens. The Fund is now aimed at covering, if needed, the financing
gaps in the pension system. The success of the fund allows Norway to cover the
increases in pension benefits as well as continue to invest in long-term
assets, even if oil supplies dwindle over time.
Based on the success of Norway and others,
some African countries have sought to design Petroleum Revenue Funds based on
their own economic and social characteristics. Some of these funds focus on
accountability, some on social investments, others on transparently segregating
revenues so that efficiency gains can be realized. One of the latest efforts to
establish a system that had multiple objectives was in Chad. With the
assistance of the World Bank, the Chadian government agreed to a format where a
fund would be created and managed to benefit the poor. Once cited as a model,
the progressive fund design was recently undermined by the Government thus
resulting in a cancellation of the World Bank financing for the sector. While
this is a setback in promoting good governance, the design components of the
Fund are useful to examine.
Elements of the Proposed
Chad Fund: A Missed Opportunity?
Chad's proposed petroleum revenue
management system established a legal and institutional framework for managing
revenues from Chad's three Doba fields. Some of the features of the system
included:
- All direct revenues, royalties and dividend, are paid by
the ExxonMobil consortium into a Chadian government controlled escrow account
at Citibank in London
- Indirect revenues, income taxes on the oil companies,
and customs duties, are paid directly into Chad's Treasury
- After debt payment to the World Bank and other debtors
are withdrawn from the Citibank account, the remaining direct revenues are
allocated as follows:
- 10% into a Future Generations Fund to save for the
post-oil era in Chad
- 72% to finance capital investments in priority sectors
to fight poverty including health, education, social services, rural
development and sanitation
- 4.5% to the oil-producing region in Southern Chad as
earmarked funding
- 13.5% to Chad's treasury for discretionary spending
until 2007, afterwards will be divided into priority sectors
- A joint government civil society Petroleum Oversight
Committee will be established to approve or reject specific projects financed
by direct oil revenues.
While innovative, this proposed system did
not address the issue of financing the sustainability of the sector nor having
applications to the entire oil sector as a whole not just limited to the three
large fields. Since the government attempted to revise the draft law
establishing the system, the World Bank has postponed the financing of the
proposed Chad-Cameroon pipeline project highlighting the sensitivity of this
issue in general, and establishing accountability while maintaining sovereignty
in particular. Nevertheless, this and other examples do point out the
importance of "ring-fencing" revenues so that governance can be improved and
the financing of social investment and professional management of oil wealth
can be realized.
In addition to their accountability and
investment functions, the design of such funds can also include components that
improve the environment for financing social investments in low-income
countries. If funds also included mechanisms to promote public-private
partnerships, these Funds could be used to co-finance or co-guaranty private
finance for public purpose projects.
Public-Private Partnerships
as a Credit Enhancement Tool: Leveraging the Private Sector into Social
Investment
In addition to the accountability and
governance features of such funds, one could see how these funds could be
structured to also feature a financing tool. By establishing a percentage of
such funds, say 10-20% to not only be dedicated to financing social
investments, but to be utilized as a credit enhancement tool, tremendous
leverage could be gained. For example, if such funds earmarked say 10% of their
reserves to be used as a subordinated debt or guaranty facility for private
financed projects, both local and foreign investors could be attracted to
finance investments in sectors that heretofore would not have been financially
viable. The use of such PPP or credit enhancement strategies could extend the
long term availability of finance, both debt and equity, and make the Petroleum
Revenue Management concept not just a financier and trustee of oil wealth and
assets, but could be a catalyst for greater efficiency of capital, private
sector development, and socially responsible investment in countries desperate
for governance, capital, and social equity. Hopefully, in the future, new
Petroleum Revenue Management Funds will look to the leveraging power and
efficiency dimensions of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) as a governance
tool.
¹ The term "Dutch Disease"
refers to the deindustrialization of a nation's economy that occurs when the
discovery of a natural resource raises the value of that nation's currency,
making manufactured goods less competitive with other nations, increasing
imports and decreasing exports. The term originated in Holland after the
discovery of North Sea gas. Source:
www.investorwords.com
Copyright 2006© Institute for
Public-Private Partnerships, Inc. All rights reserved
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