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About the Author...  |
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Jacques Cook is a
project finance attorney with the law firm Allen & Overy, LLP. He was
former Senior Counsel at the Inter-American Development Bank where he helped
establish its private sector "window" in the mid 90s. Mr. Cook is a graduate of
the George Washington University, National Law Center and holds a MA from the
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He has lived
and worked in several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Spotlight on Brazil: Brazil Launches
New PPP Projects
by Jacques Cook
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Abstract |

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In this article the author discusses
the recently enacted PPP Law in Brazil and explains how it offers the
opportunity to stimulate lagging private investment in social and
infrastructure projects in that country. He concludes that while the new law
and regulatory framework for PPPs and reforms of the concession regime may be
helpful, in the final analysis, private investors will need assurances that:
(1) the regulatory institutions are adequately staffed and managed by competent
professionals: and (2) the rules of the game for dispute resolution will be
consistently applied and enforced. |
I. BACKGROUND
In 2000, I was invited to speak at a
conference in Brazil on the subject of private sector participation in the
financing of Brazil's infrastructure. At that time Brazil was beginning to
attract private capital to finance its burgeoning infrastructure requirements.
At that conference, I made the following observation about Brazil's experiences
with private sector investment in infrastructure and the difficulties in
securing financing for such projects under its concession law (Law No. 8,987 of
1995):
"My overriding theme, to the extent there is one, is that
because of the uncertainties and complexities of transactions in Brazil, it
will be difficult to obtain financing on non-recourse, project finance basis,
and that, in many, cases it will be necessary to rely on significant sponsor
support and credit enhancements to close major infrastructure deals in this
country. However, in spite of these uncertainties, the outlook for limited or
non-recourse project finance in the Brazilian market is quite promising. The
legal and regulatory issues which have often slowed the pace of investment in
some of the key sectors are being forthrightly addressed by the authorities,
and the current economic and political stability of the country appears to be
assuaging the anxieties of investors following the Asian
flu."
At that time, I was cautiously optimistic
about Brazil's experiment with private concessions and investment in
infrastructure. The Brazilian government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso had
privatized several major electricity distributors, significant private
investment had been carried out in several large toll roads, and major private
power plants were about to be financed by multilateral banks and private
lenders. But there were clouds on the horizon. Unfortunately, the wave of new
investment soon gave way to doubts about the capacity of the regulatory
infrastructure to manage relations between the public sector and the newly
privatized companies. Rio Light, the electricity distributor that had been
acquired by Electricité de France and AES ran into difficulties
implementing rate increases resulting in street protests and political
controversy at both the state and federal levels. The governors in several
states took action to bar higher tolls on a recently privatized road concession
and, in one case ordered tolls reduced by 50%.
Meanwhile, on the legal front, the
enforceability of arbitration awards against the public sector were being
questioned; the constitutionality of many of the privatizations was challenged
with many of these disputes meandering aimlessly in the state and federal
courts. These political uncertainties drove many foreign investors to exit
Brazil, or at least to refrain from further investments there. Finally,
provisions in the existing concession law severely restricted the ability of
the government to offer subsidies or guarantees to private concessions, thereby
limiting the financial options for developing viable public-private
partnerships.
In 2002 Brazil's newly elected President
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva committed his government to carry forward
privatization, but promised new legislation to provide a better framework for
public private partnerships. It took nearly three years to enact the new PPP
law (Law No. 11,079 of December 2004), which sets the stage for a new round of
privatizations and private sector investment in infrastructure. Similar changes
were introduced at the state and municipal level of government. In this
article, we highlight some of the main features of these legislative changes
and offer some comments on its likely impact on investment in infrastructure in
Brazil.
New Budgetary Authority
The new PPP Law provides new statutory
authority for the government to make direct financial contributions in the form
of guarantees or subsidies to private concessions. There are two types of
concessions authorized in the new law:
- Sponsored Concession which is a public services
or public works concession under which the private concessionaire is entitled
to both a tariff to be paid by end users and financial contribution from the
government or government entity.
- Administrative Concession where the private
entity provides services to the public entity or partner. The government entity
makes a payment on basis of the services received from the private
partner.
Conventional concessions that do not
receive any government guarantees or financial support will still be governed
by the old concession law. However, it is unclear whether the innovations
introduced in the new PPP law regarding lender security interests will be
extended to the old concession law.
Risk Sharing and Security
Under the old concession law, the lenders
were often confused about their security interests in the concession. First,
the right of the lenders to step-in and run the concession to avoid or remedy a
default by the concessionaire was not openly recognized under the law, and the
lenders were required to seek clarifications about their security interests
through direct agreements and explanatory letters from the conceding authority.
Secondly, the concession contracts did not give lenders the right to
participate in any administrative proceedings involving readjustments in the
terms of the concession. Finally, the law did not acknowledge the right of the
lenders to control the special project company (SPC) or to receive compensation
amounts in the event of early termination of the concession. These issues were
left to be negotiated case-by-case in consents executed between the lenders,
the government and the borrower. The new PPP law openly recognizes the lenders'
right to intervene in the concession, control the SPC and receive any
termination payments-changes. These changes should help reassure lenders and
developers when new infrastructure deals enter the market in search of
long-term financing.
Payments and Guarantees by
the Government
Unquestionably, the authority of the
government to participate financially in the concession through direct payments
and guarantees is the most significant improvement of the new PPP law. Like its
UK counterpart, the Brazilian charge or payment may be variable and subject to
performance guidelines. It can be made by means of cash payments, assignment of
tax credits, or other government rights of payment. Guarantees can be extended
through special funds, guarantees from third parties, multilateral agencies or
securitized pools of assets.
In February 2006, Brazil formally launched
a $1.55 billion PPP Guarantee Fund that will serve to backstop the government
payment obligations under the PPP concessions. The establishment and
authorization of this fund is the final piece of legislation needed to
implement the PPP Law. The funds assets consist of the shares in state-owned
companies including about $500m in Bank of Brazil shares, $650m in PNA da Vale
do Rio Doce shares and $ 389m in Eletrobras notes.
A new wave of privatizations
Recent reports confirm that several
projects are being readied for financing under the new scheme at both the state
and federal levels:
- BR 116/324 Road duplication project between Bahia and
Minas Gerais with the IFC involved in the financing
- MG-050 370 km concession highway in the state of Minas
Gerais linking Belo Horizonte and Sao Paulo ($293 million investment)
- Sao Paulo Metro 4 line. ($1.26 billion investment) to be
financed by the state government, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, the
World Bank ($922 million) and a private investor ($340 million)
- Rio de Janeiro by pass ($233 million investment).
These announced biddings are attracting
interest from many international and Brazilian investor groups such as OHL of
Spain, CCR of Brazil, Dragados of Spain, and Bombardier of Canada. Certainly,
this level of investor interest should reassure the Brazilian authorities and
generate more PPP projects.
Comment
Although I am greatly encouraged about
the changes about to take place in the PPP sector in Brazil, I cannot avoid
expressing a word of caution to potential investors. First, the new law will be
implemented by public agencies that are notoriously weak. Staff upgrading and
enhanced training must keep pace with the reforms in the broader legal
framework. As noted by the UK's HM Treasury¹:
"Strong
procurement skills are vital for delivering quality investments on time and in
a way that secures value for money for the public sector
PFI requires
relevant expertise- like other large and complex procurements- because it
involves long-term options appraisal, significant use of specialist advisers
and what can be complex negotiations reflecting Government's approach to risk
sharing"
PPP concessions cannot be efficiently
implemented as a true partnership if government officials are untutored in all
facets of the financing, management and operation of the private concessions.
Moreover, dispute settlement will remain problematic and could become a
roadblock to higher levels of investment if the government does not establish
improved adjudicatory procedures for handling the inevitable controversies that
will arise between the public sector and private concessionaires. Because the
Brazilian courts are notoriously slow and inefficient, investors will be leery
of relying on the Brazilian court system to resolve legal conflicts.
Finally, it will be important to develop
standardized legal documents to facilitate the drafting and negotiation of
financing and concession contracts. As noted again in the UK, the high
transaction costs (lawyers and advisors) in putting together PPP financing
packages were a serious problem that adversely affected the earlier PPP
projects. In Brazil, the standardization of project and financing agreements
should therefore be given a high priority with the assistance of BNDES, the
national development bank.
The size of the guarantee fund also has
been questioned. Will it be large enough to provide sufficient comfort to
potential lenders? In the early stages of the program, this might not be a
problem. But once the program is more fully developed the fund will probably
need further infusions of capital to support its contingent claims.
These potential concerns will probably not
prevent the program from getting started. However, experience from Brazil's
earlier flirtation with privatization in the 90s should warn us of the danger
of institutional complacency. Failure to address these problems in a meaningful
way could come to jeopardize its success at a time when the country will
desperately need the additional levels of investment. Like their earlier
counterparts, PPP concessions are not a panacea to private investment in
infrastructure. To succeed they will need to operate in a well-organized and
structured regulatory framework where the rules of the game are transparent and
predictable. Investors will therefore be looking carefully at Brazil as it
implements its new concession regime.
1 "PFI: Meeting
the Investment Challenge", HM Treasury (July 2003)
Copyright 2006© Institute for
Public-Private Partnerships, Inc. All rights reserved
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